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Abstract: My paper draws on the action-research project “Bioethics with the 
Caregivers” which I participated in as member of the Applied Ethics and 
Bioethics Team of the Urbino University. The project focused on the caring 
experiences of spouses, parents and siblings whose dear ones suffered from non-
demential neurodegenerative diseases. It was led with and by caregivers rather 
than on or for them, and brought to light philosophy's irreplaceable role as a 
critical and dialogic toolbox in dealing with unexplored and/or unaddressed 
needs. This paper shows how a philosophical approach to caregiving in 
neurodegenerative diseases puts the more general dynamics of interdependence 
under a magnifying glass for questioning the priority of the autonomy principle 
and revaluing outmoded frames of mind and assumptions. The hope is that a 
more informed and open-minded approach to out-of-the-ordinary conditions can 
contribute towards a breaking down of the fears which prevent an appreciation of 
the richness of difference.   
Keywords: Bioethics, caregiving, neurodegenerative diseases, autonomy 
principle 
 
Resumen: Mi artículo explica el proyecto “Bioética con cuidadores”, en el que 
participe como uno de los miembros del equipo de ética aplicada y bioética de la 
Universidad de Urbino. El proyecto se centró en las experiencias de cuidado de 
esposos, padres y hermanos cuyos seres queridos sufrieron enfermedades 
neurodegenerativas no de tipo no-demencial. Se llevó a cabo con y por los 
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by idUS. Depósito de Investigación Universidad de Sevilla
LUISA DE PAULA 
 
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 175-203 
176 
 
cuidadores y no sobre  o paraa ellos. Esta actividad descubrió el papel 
insustituible de la filosofía como caja de herramientas de crítica y dialógica en el 
trato al tratar con necesidades inexploradas y/o desatendidas. En este trabajo, se 
muestra cómo un enfoque filosófico de los cuidados prestados en enfermedades 
neurodegenerativas amplía la perspectiva sobre la dinámica habitual de 
interdependencia para cuestionar la prioridad del principio de la autonomía y 
para reevaluar los marcos y suposiciones antiguas. Se pretende que un enfoque 
más informado y de mente abierta alejado de lo habitual pueda contribuir a una 
ruptura de los temores que impiden una apreciación de la riqueza de la 
diferencia. 






When I was born my aunt Fulvia was thirteen years old, and I saw 
her as the best and the most beautiful of all human beings. I would 
have done anything to look like her. I dreamed that when grew up I 
know all the songs she knew, speak and understand all the 
mysterious languages she spoke, and have access to the mysterious 
world she seemed to belong to. The way she talked, ate, climbed 
the stairs was absolutely unique, inimitable, and different from 
anyone else. Whatever she did, I wanted to do the same. She had 
the real power; she was a queen. And the reason that my aunt 
Fulvia was so lucky was born with an extra chromosome 21 gene in 
every cell of her body, a condition which is also called as “down 





The philosopher looks at the world as one who, grown old, is 
finally able to see and choose the wisdom of the child. This might 
be what Aristotle means when he connects the always rebirthing 
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origin of philosophy with the puzzle and wonder that carries us 
through the unfathomable mystery of nature.
1
 In more recent times, 
Husserl's phenomenology has come back to this core philosophical 
attitude by actualizing the ancient concept of skepticism, the 
epoché, or “suspension of judgment.” To the extent that it is 
possible, the philosopher's gaze strives to strip off all assumptions 
which might pollute its clarity. To the extent that any human eye 
can aspire only to a limited viewpoint, philosophical sight brings 
from within the awareness of its situatedness as a marker of both its 
contingent conditionality and the possibility of shifting between 
different positions and orientations. The philosopher's gaze strives 
to turn for a 360 degree perspective on things and situations, 
enjoying the disorientation and wonder which result from seeing 
differently from others, or from the same ways in which others tend 
to see. This ability to discover and amplify differences is the very 
antithesis of any kind of in-difference.  
Philosophy's engagement with wonder and difference is woven 
its peculiar epistemological status with respect to other and more 
recently created forms of knowledge. Whereas sociology and 
medicine, for example, aim at a certain degree of objective 
knowledge and apply theoretical frameworks to objectified 
problems and cases within their respective fields, the philosophical 
“love for wisdom” has no particular content of its own which 
separates it from life or knowledge, since it is a ongoing process of 
research rooted in concrete existence, with no claims to a field of 
its own purified of the contingencies of life, not to access to some 
kind of objective and universal certainty.  
Far from perceiving himself as an uninvolved and unchanging 
observer, the subject pursuing philosophical investigation is fully 
engaged in the process of knowing, and being transformed by this 
                                                          
1
 ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics A2, 282 b, trans. W. D. Ross, 
https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/metaphysics/index.html (last access 
September 2th, 2015). 
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process is among the motivations spurring him to undertake the 
unpredictable path of research. In this respect, philosophical 
exploration stands at odds with modern epistemology, which only 
credits as scientific knowledge that leaves unchanged whatever 
falls under its field enquiry. This brings it closer to the 
epistemological models drawn from post-Eisenstein Quantic 
Mechanics, which acknowledge the scientist's act of observation as 
producing certain effects on what is under observation, so that the 
content of knowledge is shaped by the dynamic relationship 
between observer and observed.  
This entanglement between knowledge, observation, and 
transformative (inter)action is at the core of contemporary applied 
philosophy and philosophical practice, where the research process 
is nourished by love and wonder for what is still not known 
inducing positive change and transformation from within. Here the 
adjective “practical” does not really stand in opposition to a 
theoretical option, but it rather identifies the genuine goal of 
philosophy as some kind of transformative action expected to be 
inherent in the research process itself.  
What we might refer to as “doing philosophy” is at one and the 
same time research and action: it is the development of a thought 
embedded in lived experience, in the body, in the habits and feeling 
which sustain everyday life. Rather than giving up theory 
altogether, philosophical practitioners give up theory's pretension 
to providing an understanding of each concrete case to satisfy the 
needs of practice, and hence giving up their option to draw from 
time to time from different theoretical frameworks in order to take 
advantage of whichever one seems adequate to dealing with the 
situation at hand. Within this perspective, theoretical options are 
themselves practical resources, tools to be experienced and adapted 
to concrete specific circumstances. On the practical ground, these 
are the starting, the ending and constant reference point of the 
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philosophical process in its twofold value as research and 
transformative action.  
The hybridization of theory and practice marks applied 
philosophy out from both systematic philosophy and other fields of 
knowledge. Whereas theory and practice in medicine or 
sociological research are both necessary and necessarily 
interdependent but separate moments, philosophical practice 
integrates both in a single research process whose ultimate goal is 
positive constructive change. In contrast to the systematic approach 
of academic philosophy, which tends to sacrifice reality's 
multiform concreteness and unpredictable contingency to the needs 
of the theory, applied philosophy is field research which works 
outside the system with the aim of deconstructing perceptions and 
conceptions we take for granted to shed a new light and different 
alternative perspectives on what is generally conceived and 
perceived as being “just the way it is”. Applied philosophy is also 
engaged in catching and cultivating certain aspects of a reality 
which have not yet been codified in an overall system of 
knowledge, or not even perceived and conceived, so that they 
remain an unexplored potential. Differently from any systematic 
knowledge, it does not aspire to a pristine overview distanced from 
what it looks at by a grid of theory. Its ambition is to systematically 
get its out-of-the-system gaze directly inside the situations at hand. 
Theories are taken up not to avoid facing the concrete specificity of 
what is under investigation, but to help towards an understanding 
by the free exercise of intelligence and sensitivity.  
Not only does practical philosophy avoids the slavish 
adherence to explicit theories, it also avoids the automatic 
categorization processes that implicit theories activate in thought 
and perception, to which it has to address a particularly vigilant eye 
if it really aims to bring a different and transformative gaze to what 
it is trying to look at from within. 
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The vigilance of the philosophical eye is essential for a deep 
epoché, in itself essential in opening and being receptive to the 
uncharted waters of understanding. In its intrinsic involvement with 
people, the true axes of applied philosophy research is the depth to 
which it listens and discloses new horizons to thought and 
perception. What people bring to us in terms of themselves and 
their unexpected situations is much more difficult than one would 
think: it is a process whose steps are never guaranteed, and its end 
never definitive. And it is the infinite task of the philosophical 
practitioner and the researcher in applied philosophy who 
conceives of her or his work as a service to the wider human 
community, helping them to gain a deeper awareness and more 
critical approach to general commonsense conceptions that shape 
their habits and practical attitudes. Within this perspective, the 
revival of practice in contemporary philosophy shares with ancient 
ethics in its essential difference from moral philosophy.  
The Greek word éthos has a multifold sense: it means “habit, 
use, custom”, but also “character, way of thinking, inclination”; 
furthermore, it can as well indicate the house which one uses to live 
in or the calm mood conveyed by a well-achieved work of art. To 
understand the overall meaning, one should pay attention to texts of 
ancient ethics, and especially to Plato's Republic and Aristotle's 
Nicomachean ethics. Here the ancient conception of human 
character is clearly revealed as the plastic result of a ongoing 
dialectic between innate personal inclinations and behavioral 
habits, context and education. In this perspective habits and 
education are not just a matter of individual or family choice, but a 
true and important political matter since they complementarily 
shape the personal and the collective character of the people.   
Following Plato, Aristotle, and others, ethics is the discipline of 
life that promotes virtuous circularity between everyday actions, 
personal and collective attitudes, and ways of thinking. It originally 
implied a strict connection between moral theory and practical 
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training, but in the modern era Ethics has tended to be confused 
with moral philosophy and reduced solely to its theoretical 
dimension. This is why in contemporary research the diction 
“Applied Ethics” is preferred to refer  to works and research 
projects which emphasize as essential their practical aspects and 
obejectives.  
The project I am going to illustrate here below belongs to the 
contemporary fields of Applied Ethics. It was carried out by the 
Applied Ethics and Bioethics Team of the University of Urbino 
“Carlo Bo'” with co-funding from the Pesaro Savings bank and in 
collaboration with local healthcare staff, touching on core issues 
surrounding contemporary bioethics, or “Ethics of Life”. Its 
broader objective is to highlight outside-the-system look at end-of-
life situations which increasingly tend to fall under the fragmented 
gaze of specialist disciplines and the anonymous power of medical 
technologies. Our major ambition in carrying out the project was to 
dig into the human and interpersonal side of the cases at hand and 
to present a portrait from the inside which can help both the people 
involved and the healthcare system to better understand and deal 
with unmet and undetected needs
2
.    
 
 
Action-research with the Caregivers 
 
The action-research“Applied Bioethics with the Caregivers. 
Therapeutic Alliance and Quality of Life” was aimed at identifying 
the main issues concerning caregiving for people suffering from 
neurodegenerative diseases which do not imply a loss of cognitive 
                                                          
2
 A detailed report on the research-action has been published in Italian. 
ANDREANI, Monia, and DE PAULA, Luisa, La bioetica con I caregiver. 
Alleanza terapeutica e qualità della vita, Unicopli, Milano, 2015. 
http://www.edizioniunicopli.it/Novita_2015_Aprile.html (last access September 
2th, 2015).  
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abilities, such as Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), Multiple 
Sclerosis (MS), and dystrophies.  
ALS, MS and dystrophies are each different diseases with different 
prognostic scenarios and life expectancies, each presenting 
different subtypes of their own which imply as many different 
prognoses. Besides, every case of non-demential neurodegenerative 
disease is a unique, special and unpredictable. However, a feature 
they all share is a progressive loss of motor abilities without any 
parallel significant degeneration of mental faculties. People who 
are affected need increasing degrees of assistance to perform basic 
daily tasks such as eating, dressing, urinating, defeating, and even 
breathing.   
In the first stages the main target of the project was chosen; the 
eighteen subjects identified as primary caregivers with their 
attendant sufferers. However, soon after our action-research began 
we realized that the needs, thoughts and experience of the people at 
the forefront of caregiving did not lend themselves to being 
assessed without regard for the needs, thoughts and experience of 
the people they were caring for and their home environment. As a 
matter of fact, as these diseases progress, the greater the sufferers 
need for their primary caregiver, and the stronger becomes their 
bond. By the same token, the dependent relationship between 
sufferer and caregiver intensifies, the more the caregiver needing 
more support and help from other family members or professional 
caregivers and from society in general to recover some private 
space for themselves. But first, as a reference for the outline of a 
progression model for non-demential neurodegenerative 
pathologies.    
At the onset of the disease the affected person shows problems 
or defects in the movement of their limbs and body trunk. A 
contingent difficulty that may also arise at the beginning is 
dysarthria, a reduced capacity to articulate phonemes, and/or 
dysphagia, a reduced capacity to swallow. Depending on the rate of 
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progression, soon or later the sufferer must resort to a wheelchair 
and rely on loved ones for dressing and ambulatory movement. In a 
subsequent stage he or she is no longer able to chew or ingest food, 
and has to undergo a gastrostomy, which is a surgical intervention 
where a feeding tube is inserted into the stomach for artificial 
nutrition. At a final stage in some of the rare neurodegenerative 
illnesses sufferers lose their respiratory capacity and have to be 
attached to a ventilator with a tracheotomy, forming a symbiotic 
relationship with a mechanical devise which blows air into their 
lungs.  
The linear course of progression which has been just provided 
is a rough simplification. In a good number of cases remission and 
relapse phases alternate. The summary description given here fits 
people afflicted by ALS, where the conflict between motor 
disability and mental lucidity which is the hallmark of non-
demential neurodegenerative diseases in general tends to be even 
more pronounced and dramatic. At some stage in their illness, 
individuals affected by ALS go through the locked-in syndrome, a 
state in which they are still conscious but cannot move a single 
muscle of their body and are unable to communicate with the 
outside world.  
ALS sufferers can survive with locked muscles for more than a 
decade before arriving at a terminal stage. Eye muscles and ocular 
movement are usually retained the longest and can remain the 
sufferers' only means of contact with the external world. Today, 
thanks to sophisticated computer devices, the ocular movements of 
people who have lost all motor ability can be translated into written 
and spoken language. Even though ALS sufferers are completely 
dependent on others for their basic vital functions, they are still 
able to think and express themselves with the same autonomy as 
any other person enjoying perfect health.  
Our action-research hinged on a pivotal element in the 
experience of these diseases, which is the unique bond of 
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dependance that the ill person establishes with their family and 
caregivers. We were interested in exploring the thoughts, needs and 
experience of those who take charge of dear ones suffering from 
chronic diseases which aggravate their physical condition on a 
daily basis while leaving intact their ability to reason, understand, 
perceive, and feel the full gamut of emotions, pain, and fears, is left 
intact.   
We worked through four steps. In the first and preliminary 
phase we cooperated with the nursing stuff of the local Integrated 
Home Care service, who played a key role in helping us identifying 
the case histories on which to focus our attention. Eighteen primary 
caregivers and their ill dear ones and families were identified as 
participants. 
In the second stage the participants were asked to fill out the 
Family Strain Questionnaire, Short Form, a psychometric tool for 
measuring the level of distress experienced by caregivers of 
patients affected by incurable chronic diseases. The analysis of the 
questionnaires allowed us to define a first general overview of the 
caregivers' life conditions, providing demographic and 
psychometric data as well as basic information about the 
communication of the diagnosis and the management of 
emergencies and daily situations.  
In the third stage we met each caregiver in their home or work 
place, in most cases in the presence of the person they were caring 
for. This meetings were the core of the entire process. We followed 
a model of the semi-structured interviews focused on the objectives 
of the research, but we did not stick to it. Our explicit goal was to 
work with the caregivers, rather than for them or on them. What 
was most important to us was that people could introduce the issues 
they felt urgent and pressing, and that they could freely orient or 
even completely change the outline we had drawn up for the 
conversation. In this stage we were not just interviewers or 
researchers in bioethics, but philosophers engaged in a dialogue 
BEYOND THE AUTONOMY PRINCIPLE 
 
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 175-203 
185 
with the maieutic purpose of allowing unknown truths to express 
themselves through opening to the other in a relationship of 
genuine exchange and mutual support to one's own expression. The 
meeting in person with the caregivers and the visit to the homes 
that in most cases they shared with their cared for provided 
significant information integrating or complementing the verbal 
exchange.  
The fourth and last stage consisted in Focus Groups where 
caregivers were invited to participate together with the nursing staff 
and the persons receiving care still able to move. The Focus Groups 
were conceived of as a follow-up on from the home face-to-face 
interviews conducted with each caregiver and were carried out 
three months after completion of the third stage. This timeframe 
allowed us to carefully analyze the material collected and to 
identify core themes and issues. During the groups, our supervisor, 
my colleague and I facilitated the dialogue and took the opportunity 
to observe the process as participants were allowed to share and 
exchange their experiences.   
I previously referred to the project as an “action-research” 
since it involved research and action at one at the same time. As 
already mentioned, the home interviews consisted in dialogues 
carried on in the maieutic spirit of exploring and bringing in a new 
light what had been supposed to be known. In our roles as 
researchers and interviewers, we were committed to promoting a 
dialogue in which both we and the caregivers were being ourselves, 
sharing our implicit and explicit beliefs and our limited baggage of 
experience and assumed knowledge. From the beginning in most of 
these interviews were carried out for the most part as face-to-face 
dialogues between one of us and the one family member who had 
been identified as the primary caregiver, in a way that might be 
compared to a one-to-one Philosophical Counseling. Conducting 
the Focus Groups within a maieutic framework facilitated dialogue 
and encouraged a philosophical spirit of learning by an integrated 
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process of epoché, with its focus on listening to others, comparing 
and integrating arguments, building a space of shared reasoning
3
. 
Naturally enough, the group dimension left space for an enlarged 
collective dynamic rather than the asymmetric duality between 
counselor and counselee.  
Last but not least, the research was an action because it 
included in its achieved objectives the dissemination of results 
through public conferences and a report which was also published 
in a book.  
What follows is a summary of the analysis carried out on the 
research material. The main arguments developed throughout the 
project are organized around the four macro-issues that have been 
identified corresponding to the different stages faced by people 
directly and indirectly affected by non-demential 
neurodegenerative diseases and the course of their pathology. The 
first group of issues concerns the life change that had to be faced; 
the second surrounds the dimension of free will and decision-
making accompanying the process of degeneration and loss of 
motor abilities; the third refers to the resources and values 
emerging from the caregiving experience. We will start our quick 
philosophical investigation with the questions arising at the onset 





                                                          
3
 In English, Spanish, French, Italian, German and probably other languages are 
not at all familiar with the fact that the modern word “dialogue” derives from the 
ancient Greek diálogos, which in turn is a compound of the two words diá and 
lógos, meaning respectively “between, through, across”, and “thought, word, 
principle inherent to reality”. The etymology suggests that dialogue is some kind 
of “reason between”, a shared and constructive rationality gained though 
listening to the others' perspectives and (ex)change of ideas.  
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Tell (the Truth), face (the Disease)! 
 
When a diagnosis of ALS or MS is given the recipient often feels 
as though he or she has been given a life sentence. For the sufferer 
and their close relatives and dear ones, the day they are told they 
have a  neurodegenerative pathology marks a dramatic turning 
point in their life. From then on, more or less all their energies are 
focused on the disease as a invincible enemy to be fought in a 
losing battle. But to what extent does the chronic and often fatal 
course of progressive neuropathology entirely account for such an 
approach? Here the philosophical attitude of epoché in stimulating 
and listening to the narrative of the people's lived experiences helps 
to uncover what we tend to take for granted or assume is a simple 
given. This is why the two substantives you read in the title of this 
section are in parentheses: the intent is to suspend and question the 
apparent obviousness of the terms involved so as to identify and 
critically assess the impact of our implicit assumptions and 
commonsense categorizations on the way a chronic and progressive 
pathology is conceived, experienced, and perceived by those who 
“live” it as reflected through its social context.  
The “to tell (the truth)” in the title refers to the critical issues 
surrounding the crucial moment when the definitive diagnosis is 
revealed to the diseased person, in 99% of cases through a process 
of mediation by one or more of the closest family members. Almost 
a cliché for the philosopher, skepticism about the truth of the 
disease might here prove useful to all the parties who are 
concerned. First of all, it has be said that ALS, MS and related 
diseases are large diagnostic categories, each presenting different 
subtypes and symptomatology. Every case is a case on its own, so 
that the trend and rate of the disease progression cannot be 
predicted: the person affected can lose all her motor abilities and 
die within a few years or go on for decades in relatively good 
conditions. To this we must also add that most of 
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neurodegenerative diseases can be ascertained only through 
differential diagnosis, which in most cases comes after long and 
exhaustive research excluding disorders with similar 
symptomatology or symptoms that tend to be overlooked both by 
medical doctors and laymen.  
The wait for a definitive diagnosis is an aspect that contributes 
to conferring on this particular moment its peculiar revelatory aura. 
“There was no diagnosis” were words we often heard from our 
interviewees who had to spend months or even years with the 
anxiety of not knowing what was happening to their loved ones. 
Another related problem is the authoritative role played in the 
process by the medical doctor, who in our self-styled lay society 
tends to take on the role of a secular priest of a human life in its 
rejection of death as a foreign and terrible enemy
4
. Sufferers people 
and their relatives expect the truth from the voice of science, as 
though awaiting and oracle from on high, with the result that the 
message is bound to sound inadequate, incomprehensible, or even 
inadmissible.  
The technical nature of medical language is only partly the 
issue at stake here. Rather, the overall problem is the assumptions 
underlying what might be referred to as “the truth of the disease”. 
In the case of neurodegenerative pathologies, such truth is 
perceived and conceived as an overwhelming entity that the 
medical doctor tend to deliver to the sufferer's closest family 
member(s) with his hands raised in resignation, given the 
                                                          
4
 The conception and perception of death as the opposite to life is a byproduct 
of the modern mentality. An early definition of these terms comes from Xavier 
Bichat who identified life with a set of functions resisting death. In the antiquity, 
death was considered inherent to life. In this respect, an example is found in 
Aristotle, De anima, 412 a, where the philosopher defines life as “the process of 
nutrition, increase and decay from an internal principle”. ARISTOTLE, On the 
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unavailability of a cure. But the fact that the disease will be 
ongoing is just a part of the truth and sometimes not even that, 
since what it really means to be affected by a little known and 
chronic pathology is something that has to be first and foremost 
lived and experienced day-by-day, with peoples' heart and mind 
open to the irreducible singularity and unpredictability of the 
situation. Different aspects should be here taken into account to 
critically reconsider how a neurodegenerative disease and its 
alleged truth is perceived and faced by all who are involved.  
First of all, more than any other pathologies not subject to 
curative treatment, progressive neuropathology show how little 
science is able to tell us about the “truth” of human life and its 
degenerative and recovery processes. This is best illustrated by a 
case in our own research where a man was returned home after a 
year in hospital with a locked-in syndrome, his wife having been 
told he would never recover. He had had a tracheotomy to keep 
him breathing and a PEG feeding him artificially. From the local 
healthcare services he had received an eye-controlled computerized 
communicator which costs about 15.000 €, only to have it promptly 
returned by his wife, who refused to give in to the locked-in 
sentence, and was determined to work with whatever her hearth 
and her mind suggested to her on a day-by-day basis to help her 
husband regain what few abilities were still left to him.   
When I interviewed the couple the man was in a wheelchair but 
could walk a few steps with his wife's support; he had no 
tracheotomy and no PEG and could breathe and eat on his own; he 
could articulate words in such a way that I could understand what 
he was saying. “They took for granted that he would remain 
bedridden for ever...” His wife and caregiver told me. They went 
on to say: “Medical doctors should not take what they have studied 
for granted. They should be careful with their diagnoses, give them 
gradually, day-by-day”.  
LUISA DE PAULA 
 
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 175-203 
190 
 
These words show some of the other problematic aspects 
inherent in communicating a diagnosis as a “revelatory moment of 
truth”. One of these is setting time as a constitutive and essential 
part of the truth itself. In more than one sense it would appropriate 
to demystify the “truth of the disease” and return it to what it is in 
terms of the malaise and its possible care, as experienced moment 
by moment. Since is that there is neither a reliable prognosis nor 
adequate knowledge of the diseases here in question, a diagnosis 
where the name of the pathology is communicated actually says 
very little about the future of the sufferer. Trying to sent the 
chronicity of the disease becomes becomes a stop-gap for the 
absence of certainty, something which the modern mentality seems 
incapable of coming to terms with.  Cases such as the one 
mentioned above clearly shows that cooping with an uncertainty 
might be far more profitable than to an obsessive quest for 
certainty, an example of how facing the prospect of progressive 
neurodegenerative impairment could be extended as a truth for life 
in general in crisis situations.  
Another sense in which truth cannot be separated by its 
temporal deployment is the gradual way in which a diagnosis is 
formulated and then communicated. In one of our cases two 
different medical doctors both gave identical diagnosis to the same 
sufferer, whose reaction to each was reflected in the different 
sensitivities to time and graduality the two doctors showed. In the 
first consultation, the doctor spoke directly and hastily, without 
leaving space for listening and genuine interaction. The patient's 
reaction was to not believe him and look for a second opinion
5
. 
This was a physician who treated the diseased man more as an 
                                                          
5
 Disbelief and search for a more clement diagnosis are a typical an in a sense 
“natural” reaction when a severe disease is diagnosed. Communication, however, 
has a crucial role in shaping the ill person's attitude towards her condition. See 
KÜBLETR-ROSS, Elisabeth, On Death and Dying, Simon & Schuster, New 
York, 1969.  
BEYOND THE AUTONOMY PRINCIPLE 
 
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 175-203 
191 
interlocutor than as a patient, who listened and was sensitive to his 
unexpressed needs and was open to a 360° treatment. They a 
number of dialogues to which were followed by an agreed program 
of care and treatment, a long process which allowed the sufferer, 
his caregiver, the medical doctors and the other people involved to 
undertake a shared path to face the gradual change of life that a 
neurodegenerative pathology imposes on a sufferer and his family.  
This case shows the need to work on perceptions surrounding 
the “truth of the disease”, not as something imposed from an 
outside authority, a new “ground zero” in the life of the sufferer, 
but rather a process to be continuously renegotiated according to 
the changing needs and circumstances of the one(s) who are 
involved, with genuine communication in the etymological sense of 
“common action”, or “doing together”. In other words, the truth of 
the disease should be lived and experienced through a therapeutic 
alliance involving all the participants, which starts with a first 
effective diagnosis and is thereafter consolidated step by step.   
In Italy a lot of work is still to be done, especially with respect 
to the conspiracy of silence towards the sufferers which is usually 
the rule. In most cases, the person who is informed of a chronic 
and/or fatal diseases often by busy doctors, is not actually the 
sufferer, but a close relative, the person who is most likely to fulfill 
the role of primary caregiver, also the one who will carry the 
burden of “truth” and act as a truth-mediator with her or his 
diseased dear one. In this respect, a comparative action-research 
within European countries to identify common guidelines would be 
highly desirable.  
 
 
To Choose Or Not To Choose: That Is the Question 
 
The second macro-issue which arises from the results of our 
research-action with caregivers in a philosophical spirit of 
LUISA DE PAULA 
 
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 175-203 
192 
 
investigation concerns the effective value of the autonomy 
principle, highlighted as the the impairment of motor abilities 
progresses and the sufferer is can no longer walk without a 
wheelchair, nourish himself without a feeding tube or breathe 
without a respiratory machinery.   
While theoretic debate rattles on concerning the measures 
necessary to ensure freedom of choice on the part of the diseased 
person, contact with the situations on the ground at each of these 
stages raises the question of whether there is really a margin of 
choice, and for whom, and whether the classical autonomy 
principle is even appropriate.     
 
“I had to get accustomed to the wheelchair and it hasn't been simple” an 
extremely determined and positive women who had been diagnosed ASL 
eight years before told us. “Even today, when I see it in the morning for the 
first time after I woke up, my wheelchair has an effect on me....but there 
came a moment when I just said to myself: Either I become a recluse in my 
own house or I go out as I am. If that's a problem for some people, it is not 
my problem, because I've already got lots of problems!” 
 
We nicknamed this woman “her own caregiver”, but she shows 
how going out with a wheelchair  becomes a problem only when it 
is seen or supposed as such by other people and society at large. In 
other words, the problem with a wheelchair is part of the social 
stigma attached to disease: one that adds to the burden of physical 
impairment and that could be alleviated through a systematic and 
through philosophical work of questioning the suppositions shaping 
and underlying our general attitude when faced with a chronic 
disease.  
Another painful step has to be taken when eating becomes a 
danger because the diseased person risks choking or dying of 
pneumonia ab ingestis while trying to swallow. At this point 
natural nutrition ceases and the sufferer has to accept to have a 
feeding tube inserted into their to stay alive. Although for many it 
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is a hard decision, if a PEG (Percutaneous Endoscopic 
Gastrostomy) allows one to survive through the compromise of a 
feeding tube, it is something that sufferers and their families and 
caregivers do not usually question, invasive and distressing though 
it is: feeding through a straw and forgetting flavors is a price they 
pay without even wondering if it's worth it.   
When breathing also ceases to be a spontaneous, autonomous 
activity, the story changes. The sufferer and their families and 
caregivers start asking themselves questions and having doubts 
about whether they should rely on technology just to allow life to 
drag on for as long as possible. This is the moment when a matter 
of choice seems to arise and actually does become an issue of 
debate amp to rely on technology to allow life to drag forward as 
long as possible. In theory legislation allows sufferers to refuse 
tracheotomy whereas artificial nutrition is still a mandatory 
treatment which cannot be refused by the sufferer who would die of 
starvation without it. This is the stage that provokes bioethical 
debate on decision-making and issues of choice. But when the 
concrete situations of the sufferers are approached in practice, one 
realizes that the terms in which the debate is formulated tend to 
oversimplify and disguise the complexity of the issues involved.   
Theoretical debate tends to overlook the relational and 
temporal dimension of free choice and decision-making within the 
concrete, lived experience of the sufferers and their families and 
caregivers. First of all, what a person decides after thorough 
reflection is not necessarily what the selfsame person may want at a 
later stage when the first respiratory crisis suddenly occurs. In this 
regard the caregiver of a man suffering from ALS and bedridden 
for ten years gives us an illustrative example:  
 
The moment came when the doctor told me he needed to know 
whether my husband would want to be helped with any means 
possible, even if he knew it meant not being able to breathe any more 
on his own. The hospital wasn't that well equipped to face respiratory 
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emergencies, and they wanted to know in case other, more specialized 
machines had to be brought in for the treatment. I spoke to my 
husband, and he told me that he just wanted that things to go on as they 
had to, that he didn't want to be obstinate or cause any problems. But 
when the first crisis occurred he completely changed his attitude. He 
wanted to be hospitalized with all the specialized care, he wanted to be 
operated on. It was his survival instinct coming to life. He said: 
“Whatever help you can get, take it!” And you know, when it comes to 
the reality, it's a bit different story! 
 
Other witnesses had similar experiences. Another example exerted 
from an interview with the sister and caregiver of a 50 year old 
man suffering from ALS.  
 
When I told him my brother would say no to tracheotomy, the medical 
doctor immediately reassured me: “He'll want it” he said me with a 
confident smile: “Most people say they won't, but, in the end, they take 
it 
      
This presents us with another problematic aspect within the 
theoretical terms of decision-making issue: is the margin of choice 
given within this kind of situations really something that only 
concerns the person affected by the neurodegenerative disease in 
their capacity of thinking and deciding autonomously? We have 
already noted how the hallmark of progressive neuropathologies is 
the maintenance of cognitive ability in contrast to the loss of motor 
ability. But what use is this autonomy of thought when there is 
complete dependence on others for any elementary task required 
for simple survival such as eating and going to the toilet?  
Here the (inter)dependence relationships shaped by 
neurodegenerative diseases might work as a magnifying glass on 
the same relationships which occur in ordinary, everyday life, and 
show the limitations of the commonsense concept of autonomy 
underlying our legislation, society, and mental frameworks.   
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As a matter of fact, irrespective of whether the margin of 
choice is actual or alleged, the option to prolong one's own 
bedridden life on a respirator has an impact not only on the ones 
who take the option to continue to live, but perhaps even more so 
on their caregivers and dear ones: if they decide to let themselves 
die they deprive their loved ones of their presence for the time they 
would have survived attached to a respirator; on the other hand, if 
they decide to prolong their lives, they commit loved ones, and 
especially their primary caregivers, to the delicate and full-time 
task of caring for them while they live on through a mechanical 
devise. We should not overlook the fact that even clumsy accidents 
like a brief power outage can be fatal to anyone attached to an 
artificial life support system, so that the presence of primary 
caregivers and close family members is vital round-the-clack, often 
irreplaceable. In such situation the idea of having the life of the 
paralyzed person in one's hands becomes as powerful as it is 
illusory and deceptive, and naturally brings with it fear, anguish 
and a sense of inadequacy, making it very difficult for primary 
caregivers to find closed family members or even paid caregivers to 
relieve them of some of their round-the-clock tasks.     
Reviewing what we have said leads one to question what 
exactly we are talking about when we call into question that 
principle of autonomy that is so invoked in legislation and the 
international press. As one for the leading issues of social 
legislation and society in general, with all its accompanying 
ambiguities and confusing abstractions, it has percolated down to 
find itself rooted squarely in a profound understanding of day to 
day life as lived by caregivers, although this is not a problem that 
can be addressed here.  
However, the larger issue of autonomy remains as a backdrop 
to specific problems which arise in relation to the larger issue of the 
caregiver's experience. If one asks the question “Is becoming a 
caregiver a matter of choosing your own fate?” the traditional 
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dichotomy between free will and necessity seems not to hold 
pointing out the obscurity that surrounds many of our traditional 
principles and constructs. An inescapable duty which imposes itself 
as an ineluctable task may be compatible with rational will, or at 




To-Give-and-to-Get. Outmoded Values and Unexpected 
Resources in the Experience of Caregiving 
 
The interviews and working groups showed that caregivers felt the 
role they had undertaken and the tasks that went with it had been a 
free choice, but were also fully aware of the renunciations they 
implied. 
 
I'm not obliged to do what I do.” said the wife of the man mentioned 
above who had been diagnosed with permanent locked-in syndrome. “I 
could have said: “Yes, you are my husband and I am very sorry for 
you, but I have to go on living my life. You stay at home, and I keep 
doing what I have to”. But I could never do that, because I love him! I 
want to do what I do with him, and I know he'd do the same for me if 
he was at my place 
  
Among the cases in our research, the one that is perhaps the most 
illustrative in this respect concerns a man in his forties who was 
born shortly after his father had been diagnosed with MS and then 
lost his mother when he was still a young boy. He had took charge 
of his father and held his ground against relatives and friends 
warning him to think of himself.  
 
I was told that I had scarified my life to be with him, that I would not 
be able to have a family because I'd be tied to a disable person at 
home. It was even suggested that I think of myself and put him in a 
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home...With everyone telling me what I should do, I cut myself off 
from every relations and friends straight past 
 
Beyond the strong dose of resentment that comes through here, the 
philosopher perceives a sense of conflict which is not necessarily 
justified by circumstances.  
In fact, in the words and suggestions of relatives and friends 
that constitutes the male caregiver's immediate world, “thinking of 
one's self” seems to stand in as axiomatic and uncritically accepted 
in contrast to “thinking of someone else”. The long-standing 
dichotomy between egoism and altruism is automatically assumed 
within a context where it is bound not to work. As a matter of fact, 
the caregivers' thinking of one's self obviously implies also 
thinking of one's dear one who one is caring for, while it is less 
obvious the other way round, which is to say that thinking of the 
dear one who one is caring for also implies thinking one's self for 
the caregiver who act in the name of hi or her own love and 
feelings. More than in other and more ordinary interdependence 
relationships, here it is an outmoded “We” who has to be thought 
of in spite of any self-proclaimed ideology of loving and thinking 
to oneself as if this self was a self-sufficient subject whose interest 
can be clearly distinguished from the interest of his surrounding 
world. But this idea of self-love, self-interest and thinking of one's 
self as separated from the love, interest and thinking of one's dear 
ones is hard to overcome and produces perceptual and conceptual 
effects beyond the immediate relationships between caregiver and 
cared for. These effects can also be seen in the way the family unit 
struck by a neurodegenerative diseases perceives and conceives 
their relation with their relatives, friends, and social surroundings.  
In most of the cases involved in our action-research the caregivers 
interviewed reported that they did not receive significant support 
from their friends and wider family circle. In some cases they 
regretted not getting the degree of participation and help they had 
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expected from their relatives and closest friends, but in the largest 
majority of cases they claimed they never expected such help, and 
that it would have been unfair, for example, to ask a friend to help 
them with a bedridden father or  husband or brother even for going 
to the toilet. “They have their own problems” and “Everyone has 
their own problems” were leitmotivs that I often heard from 
caregivers claiming not to have been disappointed because they had 
not expected anything from the outside the closest family unit. But 
here again: are we really sure that everyone has his or her own 
problems and that it must be so? Other voices in our action-
research suggested otherwise that problems can be shared, that the 
mere fact of being shared can alleviate and reduce a problem as 
well as give significant help and support to people who have to face 
it.  
Two cases of two women stand out from the others in showing 
this principle of a problem shared is a problem halved. The first is 
the woman previously referred to as “caregiver of herself” who 
overcame her initial temptation to hole up in her house and lean 
only on her husband and other closer members of her family, 
instead opting to maintain and strengthen her network of relatives, 
friends, colleagues and social acquaintances, hence spreading the 
“burden” of assistance. Granted,  her own cheerful character and 
the richness of her interests was another source of support, yet day 
by day she managed to build around her a real win-win solution.   
The other case is that of the “veteran caregiver” who, as already 
mentioned, had been looking after  her bedridden husband for ten 
years. After her first years of caregiving this woman realized that 
she needed some help, and after an unsatisfactory experience with 
psychology found a way of sharing her burden by forming an 
association with a women's group.  
 
“You know, it is real that a problem shared is a problem halved” she 
told me. “It is all an exchange. One of us talks about her problems with 
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her son, another about her violent husband. You somehow go beyond 
yourself and your own problems because you can really feel and 
understand you are not alone” 
 
The way in which our participants preferred an exchange among 
peers to the paths offered by psychology was a recurrent pattern in 
our research. Not a single one of the caregivers who had gone 
through psychotherapy felt it had been useful to them. Caregivers 
who are engaged round-the-clock in supporting their dear ones', 
who in turn depend on them in order to face the unpredictable and 
progressive worsening of their life condition, often feel that people 
who have not lived through the same or at least some similar 
experience simply cannot understand them, irrespective their 
professional skills and background. On the other hand, they are 
eager to share and enrich their experience exchange which is part 
of a practical and emotional approach to everyday life useful 
beyond mere words. By the same token, in the words on one of our 
interviewees, talking about what they are living through just to talk 
is probably the thing caregivers need the least. As a matter of fact, 
when asked what they would do if they had the opportunity to 
spend some free time outside the home and their caring tasks, they 
preferred physically and/or socially active options such as going for 
a walk, swimming, or similar pursuits.  
Again, it was our “veteran caregiver” who proved the most 
conscious and lucid witness to how caregivers generally feel about 
their own's need for help:  
 
“I went through three, four, maybe five psychological sessions....but 
they were very discursive and I decided to stop, because my approach 
was: Look, I've got a difficult reality, a difficult life, ok, but I don't 
want to escape from it, because it's mine! I went along without a 
problem for 45-46 years, and than this blow came...but what's the use 
of complaining? I prefer to have an exchange with other people who 
are facing difficult situations rather than talk about myself: It's more 
constructive!” 
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Other participants said the same. A young woman caring for her 
mother suffering from ALS reported that her psychologist's 
insistence that that she had to think of herself bore no relation to 
what she was living and going through. 
 
“It wasn't what I needed. I want to go on doing what I do for my mother, 
even do more. This is also why if I have to open up to someone, I prefer to 
do it with people who are living through my same problem or something 
similar....That's what really helps! Even if it's just saying 'hallo' to someone 
who's going through what you are going through, that makes you feel you're 
not alone and gives you strength. It's really important!”   It was the same for 
the woman the women caring for her husband already quoted above: “If I 
have to talk to someone that cannot understand my problem because they 
haven't lived through it...no way! I'd rather talk to a wife, a mother, a sister, 
someone who knows what I'm talking about because she lives it on her 
skin” 
     
As a matter of fact, it was not just to other caregivers that 
caregivers opened up, but also when there was an opportunity to 
spend some time out, like going for a pizza or a walk. On the other 
hand, their association with people that had constituted the usual 
social environments of acquaintances and friends before the life 
change imposed by neurodegenerative disease turned out to be no 
longer as pleasant as before, even engendered discomfort and 
impatience. Our interviewees often reported that when going out 
with old friends they were uncomfortable with the general topics of 
conversation, which could no longer hold their attention. Even 
when they just went out with a single friend, where a one-on-one 
relationship might seem best for understanding one another they 
felt alienates though they had no real interest in what was being 
said and done. The caregivers interviewed attribute this to the fact 
that their daily life was now so different from the relatively 
ordinary and “normal” one they used to have and their old friends 
and acquaintances continued to have. However, this “difference” 
and “deviation” from ordinary life, should not be one-sidedly 
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In its etymological sense the word “sacrifice” means “making 
sacred” and has little or nothing to do with the idea of masochistic 
self-restraint one tends to associate with it a time dominated by the 
blurred ideology of Autonomy and Self-Sufficiency. In Christianity 
and all other religions, sacrifice's aim is to engender sharing and 
communion among the different roles of its various participants. 
Sacrifice and communion take the lineaments of community and 
defines its relationships as pristine and priori to the single 
individual, and use them to redefine the boundaries of the self. In 
current western society the “I” comes first, but this “I” often suffers 
from self-imposed limitations which construct boundaries against 
forming strong and profound relations with others.  
A woman who was taking care of her tracheotomized father 
while also caring for her two children and her mother suffering 
from dementia confessed to me her irritation with people showing 
compassion for her. She felt that such people understood nothing 
about life: love and only love is what fills our existence with 
meaning. Richness in life comes from sharing and giving. Nothing 
else gives a substantial value to our being-in-the-world.  
Of course, the continuous and daily engagement with love that 
is caregiving for a dear one who has lost motor autonomy brings 
with it its burdens charge of work and renunciation of the pleasures 
of light entertainment, such as taking one's own children to the 
funfair or going out for a coffee with friends. But it is just this kind 
of strong engagement that brings with it a discovery of the strength 
of life itself when it is confronted with its most important 
challenges. This is what the women mentioned earlier describes it: 
                                                          
6
 See GIRARD, René, Sacrifice, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris 
2003; GIRARD René, The Scapegoat, John Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, 1986; GIRARD René, violence and the Sacred, John Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 1977. 
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“The more I took on my shoulders, the heavier backpack became 
heavy, and the more I stood up straight and walked.”  
What can help to lighten a heavy backpack is humor, which 
emerged as an unexpected resource in our action-research with 
caregivers. Jokes, quips, and teasing were frequent among people 
suffering from neurodegenerative diseases and their caregivers. 
These last were far more likely to joke in the presence of the 
sufferers they are caring for, largely as a response to the need to 
lighten what would otherwise be an unbearable heavy situation. 
The sufferer and caregiver both had to have an outlet, a way of 
playing things down, given that they faced incurable illness, 
worsening handicaps and an increasing dependance on strenuous 
and constant care. Humor became an irreplaceable tool in looking 
at and talking about a harsh reality in a bearable form. It functioned 
as a sort of communication code for speaking out about issues 
which could never be openly discussed. For families living with a 
neurodegenerative disease, humor is a vital filter for addressing 
what most worries them a future dominated by worsening disease 
and impending death
7.
    
 
 
A very Short Final Postscript 
 
The chronic and progressively worsening life-conditions 
determined by neurodegenerative diseases act as a magnifying 
                                                          
7
 On the value of humor in facing the vulnerability of human life see AMIR, 
Lydia: “Philosophical Humor for Women – (and Men): Fighting shame and 
Disgust”, in DE PAULA Luisa and RAABE Peter, Women in Philosophical 
Counseling. The Anima of Thought into Action, Lexington, Lanham, 2015. Pages 
83-97. In Amir's reading a truly (philosophical) humorous view of life 
overcomes the unilateral gaze of both the tragic and the comic to actively 
embrace the overall truth of existence in a way that makes it acceptable to a 
human being. Also see AMIR, Lydia, Humor and the Good Life in Modern 
Philosophy: Shaftesbury, Hamann, Kierkegaard, Suny Press, New York, 2014.   
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glass under which a number of outmoded values are placed: 
interdependence, sacrifice, vulnerability to humane existence's 
irreducible uncertainty, the unpredictability of future events. 
Whereas the universalizing and categorizing gaze of natural and 
human sciences as medicine and psychology fails to assimilate the 
autocatalytic potential of caregiving's experience, a genuinely 
humble philosophical approach can open up the space to the 
unpredictable inventiveness of different experiences and the 
richness resulting from their enhancement and comparative 
exchange through dialogue.       
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